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Delusion is usually considered in DSM 5 as a false belief based on incorrect inference
about external reality, but the issue of delusion raises crucial concerns, especially that
of a possible (or absent) continuity between delusional and normal experiences, and the
understanding of delusional experience. In the present study, we first aim to consider
delusion from a perspectivist angle, according to the Multiple Reality Theory (MRT).
In this model inherited from Alfred Schütz and recently addressed by Gallagher, we
are not confronting one reality only, but several (such as the reality of everyday life, of
imaginary life, of work, of delusion, etc.). In other terms, the MRT states that our own
experience is not drawing its meaning from one reality identified as the outer reality but
rather from a multiplicity of realities, each with their own logic and style. Two clinical cases
illustrate how the Multiple Realities Theory (MRT) may help address the reality of delusion.
Everyday reality and the reality of delusion may be articulated under a few conditions,
such as compossibility [i.e., Double Book-Keeping (DBK), in Bleulerian terms] or flexibility.
There are indeed possible bridges between them. Possible links with neuroscience or
psychoanalysis are evoked. As the subject is confronting different realities, so do the
objects among and toward which a subject is evolving. We call such objects Hybrid
Objects (HO) due to their multiple belonging. They can operate as shifters, i.e., as some
functional operators letting one switch from one reality to another. In the final section,
we will emphasize how delusion flexibility, as a dynamic interaction between Multiple
Realities, may offer psychotherapeutic possibilities within some reality shared with others,
entailing relocation of the present subjects in regained access to some flexibility via
Multiple Realities and perspectivism.
Keywords: schizophrenia, delusions, perspectivism, double book-keeping, phenomenology
INTRODUCTION
Delusions are currently held, as in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), to be “a false belief based on incorrect inference about
external reality that is firmly held despite what almost everyone else believes and what constitutes
incontrovertible and obvious proof of evidence to the contrary” (p. 819). Indeed, a clinical specificity
of delusion, regarding schizophrenia, is that it can have stabilized on permanent or recurring
themes.
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Yet another trait about delusion is that it is made up from
some underlying activity, whether straightaway hallucinatory or
derived from intuition. Jaspers called this: the “atmosphere” of
delusion. Such fundamental delineation was emphasized on the
occasion of the centenary of Jaspers’ “General Psychopathology”
(Jaspers, 1963). In a recent editorial, Maj insisted on the necessity
to bridge the gap between the DSM and Jaspers’ approaches (Maj,
2013).
This is a crucial epistemological challenge: that of a possible
(or impossible) continuity of delusional atmosphere and ideas
with normal experience. Delusional activity does not necessarily
result from a radical modification of experience and may stand
in continuity with normal experience. Yet the development of
delusional ideasmay result from somemodification of potentially
altered cognitive processes.
The issue of delusion may also be viewed from a perspectivist
angle, as we shall see in the Multiple Reality Theory (MRT). This
allows for cross-clinical approach (or cross-disciplinary approach
to a clinical situation) to what may be called Hybrid Objects
(HO), by extension from Latour (1991), that is: some objects from
everyday life, which have a specific place within delusion, being
part of several perspectives or realities at a time. Such objects can
operate as shifters, i.e., as some functional operators letting one
switch from one perspective (or world, universe, or reality) to
another.
In this article, we mean to:
1. define the specific logic of the reality of everyday life, of
imaginary life, the reality of delusion and of individual myth-
making, therefore applying MRT to the reality of delusion,
raising the question of Double Book-Keeping (DBK);
2. show how such realities are intricate, allowing for bridges from
one to another within a third-party reality such as HO are
likely to provide;
3. view how such bridges and HOmay account for the flexibility
of delusion by operating in some transitional intersubjective
space-time;
4. study how these potentialities may be used as dynamic source
for psychotherapeutic action.
From an epistemological point of view, we have a triple reference
here:
First, a phenomenological one, as we rely on a clinical
method aiming at suspension of any pre-established form of
determinism. Moreover, other aspects of MRT are inherited
from phenomenology. For instance, everyday reality may refer
in phenomenological terms to the “axioms of daily life” (Straus,
1949), or to an attachment to a primordial reality, primarily
related to an intersubjective world (Blankenburg, 2001).
Secondly, a psychoanalytical one, as this approach
seems relevant to an exploration of the dynamic nature of
intersubjective relationships and the resulting production of
symptoms.
Thirdly, a constructivist/pragmatic reference may also be
appropriate here. Since only theories and interpretations
accounting for a deeper comprehension of experience, chain
sequences of living experience and the jumps implied, can
provisionally contribute to the fluidity and continuity of
consciousness. In doing so, they tend to bridge the gaps of
explanation and understanding and their own limits. Such
third-party representations favor recovery, and are therefore
welcome.
MULTIPLE REALITY THEORY (MRT)
The main theoretical reference is the MRT as developed by
Schütz (1964) and addressed by Gallagher (2009): we are not
confronting one reality only, but several. Therefore, the MRT
participates in the making up of the sense of reality: starting from
existing observation and theoretical milestones, we focus on the
possible (or impossible) evolution of the connections between
these realities, and what favors them.
Indeed, the MRT points out the notion of perspectivism,
stating the necessity to define at least two different minimal
perspectives, self and other. Grammatical persons (1-2-3,
Singular/plural) and space-time language markers (here
or there/today, yesterday, tomorrow) are essential to the
construction of these categories, with a predominance of “here
and now” (Naudin et al., 2000; Guigo-Banovic et al., 2003).
Multiple Realities proper refer to Alfred Schütz’s views that we
are confronting several types of realities, and not only one. In
other terms, MRT states that our own experience is not drawing
its meaning from one reality identified as the outer reality, that of
the senses and perceived objects, but rather from a multiplicity
of realities, each with their own logic and style. According to
such MRT making Schütz one of the first constructivists, the
reality of the senses, being also the reality of work and everyday
reality, stands above all other types of realities as the primary or
paramount reality from which all others proceed.
In this perspective the meaning of things is closely related
to the specific logic of the reality in which they appear, and a
thing may be grasped differently from several realities at the
same time. So is everyday reality essentially rooted in perception,
perceiving the world from the place where my body is, as a source
of perception and movement, “the null-point” or “point zero”
from which I can take part in the world, grasp things and meet
people. Actually, paramount reality is currently known for short
as “Reality” (Schütz, 1964) and will henceforward be mentioned
as such. Time and space are inseparably bound together, implying
some reciprocity of perspectives in a perspectivism rooted in
the physical source and living embodiment we identify as self
(Cermolacce et al., 2007; Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009).
So is there a dynamic dimension in MRT, as pointed out by
Gallagher (Schütz, 1964), combining: (1) the attraction force of
objects and related beliefs in the reality of delusion, (2) a weakness
in the attachment to reality (i.e., the loss of vital contact, weakness
of symbolic law in psychoanalysis, and weakening of minimal self
in phenomenology).
The most recent and crucial contribution on MRT consists
in a recent publication by Gallagher (2009), who retraces the
development of the notion of MRT. A first origin of this notion
was addressed by William James, who introduced the idea of
possible “sub-universes.” Schütz further developed the concept
of multiple realities, sub-universes or finite areas of meanings,
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against the hypothesis of “one unified world of meaning that is
objectively defined, in a view from nowhere” (Gallagher, 2009).
In order to exemplify how multiple realities can be articulated
with paramount (or everyday) reality as defined by both James
and Schütz, Gallagher suggests to consider several kinds of
multiple realities that we frequently engage in, such as dream
reality, fictional reality, or virtual reality. If I dream, I read a
novel, I go to the cinema or if I play a videogame or immerse
myself into a virtual world, I am somehow taken away from
everyday reality. In such other realities, I can access a changed
variation of myself, in an embodied and pragmatic way. As
Gallagher emphasizes it, in the case of a vivid immersion, my
engagement to a dream, a fictional or a virtual reality can be
“body and soul.” In other terms, my presence to the world can be
modified, and the transitions from one reality to another cannot
be reduced to adopting an alternative set of beliefs or values. Such
changes are first experienced in an existential way, “involving
a transformation of background familiarity and of the sense of
reality” for either entering or leaving various realities (Gallagher,
2009).
Gallagher suggests that entering a delusional reality may be
described in the perspective of MRT. The reality of delusion itself
allows for some specific logic: it does not go by the rules of
perspectivism, and presents a potential for ubiquity, as persons
with delusion may be both here and there at the same time,
act and communicate from a distance, feel frequently observed
while others are mind-reading their innermost secrets and giving
them orders, anticipating their actions, knowing their intentions
in advance. To them, the other may be neither seen nor grasped
but given at once, even acting beforehand, even reversing the very
movement of intentionality (Ogawa and Naudin, 1986; Naudin
and Azorin, 1997; Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009). In hallucination,
the other is not some actual alter ego but non-self, pure Otherness
or alterity that the person with delusion will eventually never
get to know anything about, other than being forcefully made to
experience it.
In such perspective, discourse—involved in the narrative
experience—may be defined as the Multiple Realities (MR) in
which the cultural codes shared in everyday life and personal
developmental acquisitions and typifications are organized.
The MRT, as reactualized by Gallagher, is not devoid of
theoretical connections with psychopathological views developed
by classical authors, such as Bleuler or Jaspers.
As in schizophrenia, delusional experience appears to exist
alongside apparent rational thinking without conflict, Bleuler
introduced the notion of DBK.
DBK emphasizes a mode of functioning on at least two
different planes, as some non-delusional everyday reality may
be observed to co-exist parallel to the reality of delusion, as
DBK would in accountancy. Sass proposes to reconsider the
notion of DBK initially introduced by Bleuler (Sass, 2014),
and also suggested the terms “Double registration” or “Double
orientation” to describe the coexistence of an absolute delusional
certitude alongside a possibility for a shareable, practical
everyday world orientation. In other words, patients suffering
from schizophrenic delusion are somehow still able to cope
with everyday reality, in spite of the incomprehensibility and
incorrigibility of their delusional stance, as though delusion were
untrue or irrelevant. The coexistence of both delusional and
everyday realms implies to a certain degree the inconsequentiality
of delusional experience. DBK may also partly explain why
current research on insight, without taking such possible
coexistence into account, may fail to give a consistent and
specific model of schizophrenic delusion (Henriksen and Parnas,
2014). In our clinical examples, we shall explore the modalities
allowing one to switch from one reality to another. In doing so,
we address the question of whether they are each permanently
accessible.
In his “General Psychopathology,” Jaspers considers reality
as characterized by a set of intersubjective conventions that
are coherent in terms of spatial and temporal structures. In
normal experience, this coherence allows us to give meaning
to reality, to access psychological comprehension (Jaspers,
1963). In schizophrenia, Jaspers postulates a breach in these
comprehension links, which he called schizophrenic “process.”
According to Jaspers, this very notion of process is the
reason why schizophrenic delusions (“delusions proper”) are
fundamentally distinct fromnon-schizophrenic delusions such as
in paranoia or in affective disorders (“delusion-like ideas”). Thus,
schizophrenic delusions would steer clear of many attempts of
psychological understanding. In a Jaspersian view, explanation
of schizophrenic delusions would not imply equivalent models
than for delusion-like ideas, from either neuroscientific or
psychoanalytical approaches.
Reality and the reality of delusion, although exclusive one
of the other, are not incompatible but compossible; they may
therefore be articulated under conditions such as some third-
party reality, transitional intersubjective space, or HO. If not,
the different realities remain in-compossible in a situation of
inflexibility of delusion, as in the clinical (counter-) example
below.
CLINICAL VIGNETTE KS (1): THE ROSARY
AND KNIFE OR MOTIVES IN DELUSION
NOT ELIGIBLE AS HO
KS, 52, the elder of 2, is suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.
The first delusional episode took place on starting reading Law at
20. KS is well-read, a fond reader of accursed poets and the bible,
keen on politics and history. He is single, close to his parents,
French natives forced to leave Algeria on decolonization before
he was born.
He presents a delusion of control, with strong and frequent
visual and auditory verbal hallucinations along two main
themes: the Cold War and his identification with Christ. These
themes are intricate in a reality of delusion wherein he may
have successive identities and enemies, mainly being Christ
working miracles, converting people, fighting communists and
Muslims alike, as a crusader would; he carries a crucifix, rosary
and knife, just in case the enemy refused to be converted.
He deeply suffers too, harassed by voices persecuting him
via comments and orders. He can communicate with God
directly.
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Although suffering from delusion and frequently hospitalized,
he lives with his family in a shared reality, having meals, baby-
sitting nephews, taking care of sick relatives, being concerned
with his father’s health and going on holiday with them. He
does not work and is granted a pension in compensation for his
handicap. During hospitalizations, he is familiar with life in the
care unit and appeased by the rhythm set by medical staff. He will
easily jump to conclusions since the inflexibility of his own belief
and delusional certitude may serve as immediate response to his
anxiety (Garety et al., 2005).
Informal support from caregivers is a determining factor
favoring the flexibility of delusional beliefs (Jolley et al., 2014).
Therefore medical staff discuss with him his current attempt at
conversion of a secretary by entering her office holding rosary
and knife, to her immediate fright. Nurses have since then been
asking him how, he thought, others might be viewing him and
the situation.
We can see here that although the crucifix, rosary and knife
are borrowed emblems from the reality of the crusades, they
cannot function as HO and do not belong to any shareable Reality
(of discourse): they have been used to break into the secretary’s
current reality of work where they do not belong, and did not
allow for any third-party intersubjective space or reality.
Indeed, as we have seen a contrario from KS (1) clinical
situation, all objects are not eligible as HO. They cannot stand
as such if they belong to the reality of delusion only and not
to two at least, including some shared reality at the same time.
Whereas delusion is in itself viewed as clearly solipsistic, if the
second condition be met concerning shared objects, it may be
interesting from a clinician’s perspective to find out about these
HO, in order to resume or facilitate discussion with the person
with delusion, or it may even be the occasion for therapeutic
intervention.
Hence the clinical relevance of MRT toward some dynamic
comprehension of delusion, showing us how some persons
presenting an episode of delusion are still confronting several
realities, some of which seem to be incompatible, while others
seem to allow for a function as transitional realities. A dynamic
approach to the links between the reality of delusion and Reality
gives better insight into the flexibility of delusion and the part
of intersubjectivity that some imaginary, linguistic or fantasy
third-party reality may play in it.
According to Gallagher, the Multiple Realities paradigm
provides an alternative to main models of delusion inherited
from neurosciences, mainly from a cognitivist perspective
(Gallagher, 2009; Sass and Byrom, 2015). Empirical studies on
delusion aim to explain delusional processes by exploring several
and distinct kinds of delusional disorders, from neurological
to psychiatric conditions. Current studies on delusions refer to
two possible main accounts: the rationalist model (based on
impaired rationality), or the empiricist model (based on unusual
experience).
In the rationalist approach, delusion mainly deals with the
alteration of reasoning, closely linked to a non-understanding
of delusional content, and does not rely on abnormal perceptual
experience (Campbell, 2001). Such approach puts the emphasis
on top-down disturbances, and relies on some altered
fundamental beliefs about the world. In its most radical
version, perception is perfectly preserved, as initially suggested
by Jaspers: delusion proper is “direct experiences of meaning while
perception itself remains normal and unchanged” (Jaspers, 1963;
Jones, 1999). In its softer and more frequently accepted version,
the rationalist model envisages the possibility of perceptual
alterations by top-down constraints, involved in the maintaining
of delusion (Campbell, 2001).
Conversely, empiricist models of delusion imply a broadly
preserved rationality, from totally intact (in its radical version)
to secondary involved (in its moderate version). These models
rely on a highly unusual experience, e.g., a perceptual experience.
Delusional content is secondarily built or translated with a
mainly rational development, and with an intact understanding
of the meaning of its terms (Langdon and Coltheart, 2000; Bayne
and Pacherie, 2004). Alternatively, progressive and intermediary
models combine bottom-up and top-down constraints, by
involving two distinct factors (first-order experience and high-
order cognition) (Campbell, 2001; Gallagher, 2009).
The possibility for a subject to take up the effect of this
dysfunction or the scientific explanations for it, into the subject’s
own perception of the world so that such personal experience
maymake sense, have led these therapies to aim at some narrative
perspective. The advantage with MRT is that instead of focusing
on a person’s experience, it is focusing on the very structure of the
confronted reality.
HYBRID OBJECTS (HO)
In this line, we may understand how some elements making up
the sense of Reality may be shared by several persons at the
same time. As the subject is confronting different realities, so
do the objects among and toward which a subject is evolving,
belong to several realities at the same time. Within each of
these realities, the object is given in some specific space-time
signaled within discourse by the interplay of linguistic markers.
The possibility for the subject to jump from one space-time to
another or combine them together results from the connections
established with an object that is making them compatible. We
call such objects Hybrid Objects due to their multiple belonging.
The dynamic specificity of HO may account for the flexibility
of delusion. These objects may be empirically located in the
space-time of primary or paramount reality. But they may also
be related to the specific space-time of the reality of delusion
where perspectivism does not apply, where temporality, free from
clock-time, may be indefinite, cyclical or reversible, where space,
free from embodiment, may be spanned disregarding distances,
measures or limits assigning everyone in the paramount reality of
nature and regarding others, to some precise location, inside or
outside.
Last but not least, HO are themselves included in a third-
party reality placing them, as it were, at the center of a plot.
This gives delusion in-the-making its own specific style and
narrative structure. Such reality is usually rooted in the cultural
background and its mood in the words or language particularities
used to describe it. It suits the subject, being made from signs
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and providing a key for interpretation, or a different conducting
thread from the one interconnecting the meaning of all things in
Reality.
HO belong to several realities at the same time. They are
bridging paramount and delusional realities, or paramount
reality and the diverse realities which, according to Schütz’s
theory, proceed from it to some extent. Such HO are often
making up a third-party reality, as fetiches can do in a religious
reality, or technical objects in the scientific reality. They bear
and crystallize a form of power over things, transcending the
space-time dimensions of reality.
These objects are a possible space-time mediation of
intersubjective relationship or relationship to the world. They
may therefore prove helpful to the psychotherapist in relating to
the person. In a psychoanalytical approach, they are related to
Winnicott’s concept of “experiencing” or “transitional” area.
Indeed, using space-time references, in terms of the logic
of infant psychic development rather than mere chronology,
D.W.Winnicott refers to a “transition phase” as an “intermediary
place” between primary creativity and objective perception
(based on the experience of Reality), also described as “the resting
place of illusion.” This transitional area (which he specifies is
neither inner nor outer space, from the infant’s perspective),
is the place for “experiencing,” the safe area “good-enough”
parenting environment allows for, and the “basis of the initiation
of experience.”
“Experiencing” contributes an “imaginative elaboration of
function” in which “play” (as a dynamic factor for creative
experience, interaction, and for making and testing hypotheses),
and “transitional objects,” have a core function. Transitional
objects are defined as these “first not-me possessions” elected
(and named) to bear this “imaginative elaboration of function,”
and are consequently eligible to represent for instance both
actual exterior mother’s breast and feeding, or an internalized
one, before any sense of self vs. other. We feel this fluctuating
and multiple belonging to be akin to the flexibility of
later perspectivism, or to the creative potentialities of HO
allowing for interactions in and out of MR, or between
self and other in a shareable Reality (Winnicott, 1953,
1958).
These HO also allow for emotions to crystallize on something
outside the subject’s person and body. Therefore they require
the person’s power to be activated, and can be targeted with
the intentionality of emotion, will or desire. Without any direct
reference to Freud, Husserl calls it “pulsional reality.” The
interplay of affordances meets the possible polarization of the
subject’s power over a given object within the relevant reality.
Here, the term of affordances refers to Gibson’s definition, as
possible transactions between individuals and their environment
(Greeno, 1994).
These objects are therefore also possible vehicles for emotions,
turning them into affects by granting them rhythm, incarnation
and temporality, according to the scale of each reality. This is a
precondition for affective transference in psychoanalysis. Such is,
in other terms, what takes place in the transitional area operating,
via HO, a transferability of emotions and affects toward an object
or from a person to another.
The existence of HO in the reality of delusion reveals a human
possibility to be part of several realities at the same time, and
for a subject shut up inside one reality only, to be set partly free
via their interplay. So can we both account for the flexibility of
delusion and for the possible conditions for a verbal treatment
of it.
In the clinical cases described in this paper, we can see, beyond
the limits of explanation, how with HO comprehension is not
unconditionally necessary for a subject to be functional: the issue
of meaning is no longer some insurmountable obstacle, provided
such HO may open access to the question of functionality, i.e.,
to the different logical places involved and the possible operators
allowing circulation between them. It is therefore quite useful to
find out what functions as HO, and learn how to use them, i.e.,
let them teach us how they can be used for therapeutic aims.
CLINICAL VIGNETTE KS (2): THE
TELEPHONE AS HYBRID OBJECT
We have chosen examples concerning the telephone as typical HO
owing to its demonstration value. The issue at stake is to favor a
patient’s ability to move from one reality to another, promoting
the emergence of creative solutions via idiosyncratic or poetic
objects (as with surrealist poetic creation or poetic games).
We are calling such objects “hybrid” since, while a subject is
self-asserting as an actor by intentionally targeting them, they are
taking part in at least two realities at the same time, the reality of
delusion and Reality.
The object here is a beige telephone at KS’s disposal as in
any hospital bedroom. The beige telephone from Reality turns
into the “red” hotline (“téléphone rouge” for hotline in French),
through which Stalin is communicating in the reality of delusion.
So the telephone is in turn a linguistic object granting KS power
in the reality of delusion, as the “red” hotline, or a simple tool,
the ordinary beige object producing a simple tone when KS lifts
up the receiver in front of others, a meaningless tone to all, that he
interprets as some coded message. As his psychiatrist entered his
room once with other staff while KS was hallucinating, claiming
to be on the phone with Stalin, the psychiatrist replied: “Please tell
Mr. Stalin that you are busy and he must call back later.”
This example shows how more flexibility can be obtained
concerning delusional beliefs, playing on the in-between revealed
and created by a HO. Of course, humor cannot be mentioned
as some magic trick from a therapeutic toolbox (Gibbs, 2007);
this is rather an illustration of a therapeutic mode of action
based on spontaneous intervention, by no means to be viewed
as some strategy. The operating mode consists of shifting from
one reality to another via some third-party reality, in this case,
from the reality of delusion into Reality via the imaginary reality
of metacognitive representation (“Mr Stalin”). The effect on the
flexibility of delusional beliefs may be noticed as the belief is
getting gradually modified. Indeed KS first answers that he is
interpreting the coded message in the telephone tone, then puts
an end to it saying: “he must have hung down the receiver.”
In a session with his psychotherapist, KS grants that Stalin
would not do so if he were not so concerned with his father’s
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health, being Stalin’s way to weaken him at a timewhen he needed
to be strong and react; at the end of the session, he proves to be
preoccupied with his father’s current condition without getting
invaded with delusional ideas, thus demonstrating how some
metacognition, i.e., thinking about delusional beliefs, may for a
short while favor some recovery (Garety et al., 2005).
KS’s telephone enables him to have a long-distance
communication with Stalin who personifies the supreme
soviet power. On one hand, as a “téléphone rouge (“red” hotline),
it gives access to a third-party reality through which KS can
do everything. On the other hand, turning beige and a banal
technical object in Reality, it enables KS to escape from the
current concrete patient/nurses relationship. The telephone
therefore materializes KS’s possible power over things, according
to the typical affordances of each reality it belongs to.
As every French person knows from school years and the
media, dating back to cold war years between Soviet Union and
the West, presidents are supposed to have direct phone contacts
likely to alleviate difficulties via what is viewed as a “hotline,”
similarly to the ones provided for users and consumers to solve
their technical or administrative problems. Just as “red tape” is
the English for “bureaucracy,” “the red telephone” (“le téléphone
rouge”) is French for hotline.
Clinical examples of the use of the telephone among patients
with verbal hallucinations show us how patients lift up their
mobile phone to the ear while hearing voices. The evident benefit
of such creations (“trouvaille”) is to minimize the social impact
of verbal hallucination and, while it belongs in the reality of
delusion, give it scope to be expressed in the pseudo-normality
and shared cultural behavior of appearances, in a (seemingly)
shared Reality. The telephone therefore seems to be liable tomake
up a possible interface between Reality (as a banal object, with
implications concerning make-believe, and the social link) and
the reality of delusion (as a modern technological object implying
different degrees of familiarity and expertise or strangeness).
In line with this notion of possible interface, we can see in
the film “Matrix” how the telephone, or a mere telephone ring,
function as “shifter” letting the protagonists from one reality
into another circulating between (supposedly) real and imaginary
worlds. This “motif ” signals, in Carrollian or Joycian manner, the
shifting from a world and space-time into another.
THE FLEXIBILITY OF DELUSION
The flexibility of delusion allows the creation or re-creation of
some intersubjective space, which may be envisaged as some
dynamic interaction of MR. This flexibility implies:
- enclaves from one reality into another;
- possible switching from one reality to another;
- mediation of some third-party reality.
This raises several questions of some possible therapeutic action
with delusion flexibility. May HO which belong to two or more
realities change in status (e.g., literal or figurative value)? Given
what circumstances or conditions? Is there any possibility to
circulate between one world or reality and another? If we hold
delusion flexibility as some dynamic interaction between MR,
then, disregarding content and theme, is it possible to accompany
or induce some adaptive flexibility?
In the journey of Don Quixote (Schütz, 1964), while the
hero is claiming a shaving dish to be a helmet in his reality
of chivalry, his squire Sancho Panza finds some compromising
solution by calling the object a “helmet-shaving-dish,” i.e., a
pure language object establishing “a sub-universe of discourse”
(p. 142) and allowing a dangerously conflictual situation to be
disentangled. This type of object, both material and linguistic, is
indeed to be frequently found as an active part of the dynamics of
hallucination, and a pivot from which it is materially anchored in
Reality.
So does KS link an object, a telephone, for everyone to see in
Reality, with a possibility to communicate with invisible almighty
speaking beings that are only present in the solipsistic reality of
delusion.
This HO, owing to its quadruple belonging (Reality, imaginary
reality, reality of delusion and the reality of the history of the Cold
War), is also a linguistic object. The “red hotline” enables KS to get
out of the tricky situation of jointly having to resume control of
his experience, live a daily life among other people, and bridge the
gap between visible and invisible, material and imaginary. And
also go on believing one can proudly live in a world that is now
over, in which his position may be pronounced invincible and
death not opposed to life, as the living and the dead are coexisting
in the present of hallucination.
Such an object functions as a bridge between a reality which
has no justification beyond itself and cannot be corrected by
experience, and the essentially perspectivist Reality. It functions
as a personal creation to control and absorb the emotions raised
by the strangeness of hallucination and alleviate its social impact.
We can see here the same dynamics as in the Bleulerian notion
of DBK.
CLINICAL VIGNETTE: ZG AND THE
SECOND-HAND BOOKSELLER’S STAND
The following clinical case enables us to pinpoint the type of
reality confronting the subject and how the subject is placed on
a double level facing delusional solipsistic reality and Reality. We
can then grow aware of different stages in the subject’s discourse,
which can be defined with reference to the type of perspective, or
reality where the subject stands.
ZG, 43 years, an only son, is a second-hand books and records
seller with a registered outdoors stand, granted municipal license
as one of a few privileged authorized professionals are. His
parents and family reality is organized with reference to the
themes of filiation and heritage; they have a nearby bookstand
as ZG shares the same professional reality as his parents and, by
extension, booksellers owning neighboring bookstands, passers-
by and all potential customers. Defining his own place and
everyone’s function in these two realities is, to him, in every
reorganizing stance of his existence, some permanent concern.
He himself describes his professional activity as structured by two
complementary functions: selling and buying, where he knows he
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has some facility at “manipulating” others, which is the source of
a feeling of guilt. The second-hand bookstand, boxes and records
making up the family, professional or administrative realities, are
the setting where ZG’s fight for acknowledgment may find some
inscription in several realities at the same time.
He was diagnosed with schizo-affective psychosis during his
first hospitalization owing to a 6month’s delusional episodemade
up of barely comprehensible ideas of filiation, grandeur and
persecution. When he is not feeling well, which is often triggered
by the arrival of some nearby rival, soon turning into a persecutor,
he is disoriented; it seems then that only delusion can provide a
set of clues to a world or reality of signs.
His delusional reality is two-fold: (i) a technical reality in
which he stands as an actor of business exchanges within the
reality of trade, and (ii) a mythical reality in which he is rich,
all-powerful and where plots are made up and he stands a victim.
According to family history, a year before her marriage and a
few years before he was born, his mother used to be a prostitute
whom his father has “bought back,” in a local historical context
very much like the Three-Penny’s Opera in which prostitution
was territorialized and prostitutes supposedly depending on their
“protector,” himself economically depending on them as his
source of revenue and business. ZG refers to his mother’s pre-
marriage situation as penniless, insecure and precarious, also
possibly raped at 16 by her supposedly violent father.
This raises aggressive insults, and questions ZG within some
moral or religious reality in which his mother is now “straight”
since she was de-blacklisted,” and in some administrative reality
in which bookstands and prostitutes alike have to be registered.
Having an honest work as established booksellers allows ZG and
his mother a “new start in life,” moralizing and normalizing
relationships with others.
We can list a number of realities in which he acts, alone or
among others:
- the professional reality of work which Schütz views as
paramount, here the trading reality where buying and selling
are the basic strategies supporting him, among the three
pillars of his paramount reality, alongside with family and
administration;
- an imaginary reality, which ZG will acknowledge when he is
not in an episode of delusion;
- the reality of delusion made up of signs and clues from the
themes of filiation and money, in which he is threatened
and his property is envied, and where he switches from
vulnerability (and a need for protection) to powerfulness;
- the administrative reality in which registrations are delivered
allowing for business practices (as bookseller or prostitute).
Two types of objects seem to achieve some specific transitional
function allowing or facilitating the passage from one reality to
another. Enclaved one in the other and mixed as the realities are
where they appear, they allow for some circulation of affects from
one to another:
i) the bookseller’s stand and boxes containing merchandise
on display, calling for envy in the theater of professional
exchanges;
ii) money, whose symbolic value is held to be essential, circulates
from hand to hand, setting the value of merchandise and
a regulation of exchanges, made desirable and warranting
stability and consideration (Bauersfeld, 1968), like the records
that ZG bought from a seller, that are causing sensation and
are purchased by others as access to the mother’s body once
was. This object may be appreciated as rarity, and price creates
consideration and pride, both in seller and buyer alike.
Indeed, we have another type of HO with the book-selling stand:
it is for ZG a place for circulation, exhibition and exchange where
his “records” are gathered and presented in boxes to be searched
by passers-by and exchanged for money. There, as in an enclave
in the midst of everyday life, the different realities and the reality
of delusion are intricate while the bookseller’s stand must have
official administrative status via a contract warranting its usual
place. And the “expenses” entailed both belong to Reality and to
the reality of delusion.
The main point is that the HO, as the telephone did for KS
(2), is maintaining a function of crystallization and space-time
orientation, of substitute bridging a gap or compensating for a
void where the subject might otherwise vanish. Such an “as-if ”
function, for want of stronger symbolical binding, is holding
together some elements which would otherwise be disseminated,
lost to some disaffected world with no possible orientation or
appropriation from a subject remaining unable to grasp it. When
difficulty arises, then a lack of solid binding between things and
between words and things is revealed, leaving room for some
open void on which delusion is building up as renouncement
or loss of natural contact with Reality. Such an issue has been
quite thoroughly discussed by Sass in an article describing how
reflexivity and delusion are complementarily compensating for a
failing in ipseity, which is the failing in minimal self at the core of
the schizophrenic experience (Sass and Byrom, 2015).
It is to be noted that exchanges are clearly regulated for ZG
by money and law, referring to his past “shameful” experience,
on learning that his mother was a prostitute before he was born
and accusing his father, who had “bought her back,” of being
responsible for passing no “heritage” or “solid values” over to him.
In ZG’s case, professional and administrative realities, via
the bookseller’s stand, are equivalent for some transitional
space between the reality of delusion and Reality, where the
substitutive function is fully working (as when the sales make
up for expenses) and delusion can recede to the back of the
stage.
We may call “plasticity” such minimal potential for evolution,
in a broader sense than neuroplasticity. Plasticity allows for
flexibility disregarding causes or conditions, which are dealt with
by cognitivist and scientific approaches as a field of their own.
The persistence of delusion is in itself a clinical issue that
we can view on its own, disregarding a joint review of its
plasticity. Concerning the development of delusion, persistence
and plasticity stand as two dynamic vectors. We clearly have to
grasp this question from either end so that it does not remain a
vague or purely theoretical issue. So have we meant to grasp it
here, in the HO to be commonly found both in delusion and in
everyday life.
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We suggest MRT can be compatible with neuroscientific and
empirical perspectives, concerning several issues:
- First, as synthetized by Gallagher (2009), bottom-up
(empirical) or top-down (rationalist) approaches to delusion
are particularly apt to MRT modelization, though we insist on
differentiating the diagnostic specificity of the distinct types
of delusion.
- Secondly, several studies on schizophrenia have recently
addressed the links between disturbed salience and delusions
associated with self disorders (Nelson et al., 2014), and this
hypothesis stands in favor of further exploration of possible
links between salience and MRT perspectives.
- Lastly, patients with schizophrenia may present difficulties in
cognitive flexibility, in terms of mental rotation. Flexibility,
bridging ego-centered perspective (about self and the
surrounding world) and allo-centered perspective (non-
related to first person perspective), would be impaired
and associated with delusional experience (Frith and de
Vignemont, 2005).
Here, MRT may be explored by using discourse analysis tools,
collecting narratives about self (Parnas et al., 2005) and world
experience (Sass et al., 2017), or focusing on discourse markers
(Maj, 2013).
CONCLUSION
We have meant to illustrate in these clinical references how the
Multiple Realities Theory (MRT) may be used to approach the
reality of delusion, by investigating the issue of DBK and the
flexibility of delusion. There are indeed some shifters or bridges
between them, via HO, being either technological or practical or
language objects.
The minimal condition for this dynamic function of HO is to
have two (at least) differentiated levels, perspectives or realities
making up the MR, while the HO belonging to these two (at
least) realities may become functional and shareable in some
third-party reality hosting them, however temporarily.
As a conclusion, the notions of MRT, DBK and HO, in
the context of psychotherapeutic treatment of schizophrenic
delusion, emphasize the core function of intersubjectivity to
experience a possibility for evolution and creative potentialities
for psychic mobility and interplay, via such objects. HO allow for
reorganization within some reality shared with others, entailing
relocation of the present subjects in regained perspectivism.
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